A column by John Paul Newport (“The Handicap May Finally Go
Global,” The Wall Street Journal, May
15, 2015) describes the USGA’s effort to establish a uniform handicap
system. Newport dutifully transcribed
everything John Bodenhamer of the USGA told him, but a strong case was never
made for implementing a global system.[1]
Combining a number of systems into one can sometimes make
sense. Having a common currency seems
efficient unless one of the countries is Greece. Having a standard railway track gauge would
have benefits unless your neighbor is Germany.
Having one ruling body for a sport would be efficient unless that ruling
body is FIFA. These examples demonstrate
standardization is not always a good thing.
It creates monopoly power which can lead to less independence and higher
costs for participating members.
Any global handicap system should meet three requirements to
be cost/effective. First, there should be
important benefits attributable to combining handicap systems. Second, the global system should be so much
better it warrants the disruption and suppression of regional systems. Third, cost savings should benefit the
participating parties. Before examining
whether a proposed system meets these requirements, we first hypothesize what a
global handicap system will likely look like.
What Would a Global
Handicap System Look Like?
It seems clear the USGA will be advocating for its handicap
system to become the world standard.
Newport calls it by far the “most sophisticated” in the world. It is not.
The USGA’s Course and Slope Rating models are flawed and have never been
empirically verified. Nevertheless, the
USGA is heavily invested in its handicap system and is unlikely to accept major
modifications in the interest of global uniformity.
The USGA can also argue its system is already used in most
parts of the world. To ensure the global
system does not have a Made in America stamp, Bodenhamer only suggests incorporating
a Daily Course Rating (DCR) which currently exists in both the Australian and
CONGU handicap systems.[2]
Another reason for believing the global system will closely
resemble the USGA’s system is monetary. The
two major handicapping systems (USGA and CONGU) are different and incompatible.
In creating a global system, one of the
systems will have to go. The USGA’s
system is designed to make handicaps available to as wide a population as
possible. Any organization can become a
USGA licensee and sell handicaps if it meets minimal requirements. Some of these organizations do not hold
tournaments on a regular basis, if at all. The CONGU handicap system bases a player’s
handicap only on tournament scores. Once
a player has established an “exact handicap,” his handicap will increase,
decrease, or remain the same based on his score in each tournament.
It seems doubtful the USGA could ever accept a system
similar to the CONGU System. The casual
player would have no reason to maintain a handicap if it was based on
tournaments in which he rarely played. If
a CONGU-like system was adopted, it would result in a large decrease in
handicap sales. Such a drop would be
catastrophic to golf associations who depend on the profit from selling
handicaps to subsidize their other operations.[3]
For the reasons of “pride of authorship,” widespread use,
and monetary considerations, the USGA could only accept a global system that
closely resembles its current system. Without
the USGA there is no global system.
Therefore, it is assumed a slightly modified USGA handicap system
becomes the global handicap system.
Next, the global system is examined to see if it passes the three tests for a cost/effective system listed
above.
Are There Important
Benefits to the Global Handicap System?
Newport relates the following story to demonstrate the
benefit of a global handicap system:
Say
you meet a 12-handicap golfer from Australia on the first tee at St. Andrews in
Scotland. If your U.S handicap index
also happens to be a 12, you might suggest a friendly money game, with no
strokes given. Bad move.
The bet is not a “bad move” as Newport argues, but it is an
ungracious move.[4] I have been paired with hundreds of strangers
all around the world and have never asked or been asked to play a match. It would reinforce the image of the ugly
American if I immediately requested my foreign playing partner to pony up for a
$5 Nassau. One of the great benefits of
golf is meeting people from all walks of life on the first tee. I have always assumed my new partners are
there to enjoy the golf and consider the course, especially St. Andrews, to be
the competition. Are there a sufficient
number of encounters between players of different countries to justify the
myriad of costs associated with a global handicap system? It appears unlikely.[5]
Is the Global
Handicap System Really Better?
Adding a DCR to the USGA handicap system has the illusion,
if not the substance, of increased accuracy.
It will cost an unknown amount to implement a DCR, but the benefits may
be ethereal. Here are some reasons why:
·
A round played under adverse conditions will
probably not be among a player’s best ten (best eight in Australia) scores used
in calculating a player’s index. In
which case, it would have only a marginal effect on a player’s index (e.g., it
could push out a low score from the last 20 scores).
·
Conditions often change between the morning and
afternoon as demonstrated repeatedly on the PGA Tour. If conditions were benign in the morning but
rough in the afternoon, an algorithm using the DCR would estimate the morning
players to be better than they really are.
·
Australia has had a DCR for some time. Golf Australia (Australia’s equivalent of the
USGA) has not published any research showing that the DCR has a significant
effect on a player’s index. I suspect
Golf Australia does not test the efficacy of the DCR for the same reason the
USGA never tests the efficacy Slope
System—neither may like the results.[6]
·
Going to a DCR will introduce even more errors
into the beleaguered handicap system.[7] There will be model errors (i.e., does the
estimating model accurately reflect reality?), sampling errors, and conversion
errors in making Stableford scores consistent with stroke play scores.
A
USGA style handicap system has much looser controls on the malevolent
player. In the USGA handicap system, a
player can play alone, post a score, and not turn in a scorecard. His non-tournament scores count the same as
his tournament scores.[8] He is also allowed to take a high number on a
hole (e.g., a seven on a par 3 for a 10-19 handicap). Peer review is also non-existent at many
affiliate clubs (i.e., clubs without a course) where members may not even have
a nodding acquaintance.[9] If these USGA controls are incorporated into
the global system, it would be difficult to argue the new system is more
equitable than the present CONGU handicap system.
The
true value of many golf statistics (e.g., Course Rating, Slope Rating, and a
Player’s Handicap) cannot be measured.
This makes it impossible to determine if a global system actually
reduces the estimating error in a player’s Index. If there were two systems for estimating a
player’s weight, for example, the more accurate system could be found by seeing
how close each system predicts a player’s true weight. If a global handicap system estimates a
player’s Index at 11.6 while the old system puts him at 11.9, there is no way
to determine which system is better since a player’s true index is
unknown. The USGA will argue the global
handicap system should give a more accurate estimate since it incorporates more
variables, uses complex models, and costs a lot of money. In truth, the USGA will have no idea if
accuracy is improved and if so by how much.
Are There Cost
Savings Benefiting Participating Parties?
The global handicap system does not appear to generate any
major cost savings. If it is
administered centrally, having every golf score whizzing around the world in
order to have a DCR for every course, is a costly use of the telecommunication spectrum. If the global handicap system is administered
on a country-by-country basis, then there certainly are no economies of scale
to be had. It is even probable costs
would increase.
While costs are not going to be lower, they can be
shifted. Bodenhamer makes an economic
argument for various associations to adopt the global handicap system when he
states the USGA and R&A will jointly bear the costs for maintaining and
updating the system.[10] Newport does not make clear who will benefit
from this subsidy. If regional
associations no longer have to pay for handicap services they could be a net beneficiary. Handicap costs, however, are a relatively
small part of the budget of most associations.
Eliminating this cost is a small economic incentive and is unlikely to
be a major determinant in deciding between a global handicap system and the
status quo.
Summary and
Conclusion
A global handicap system appears to have only a small benefit,
may not increase the equity of competition, could be costly, and is sure to infuriate
many who like their present system (i.e., CONGU). In essence, there are no strong arguments for
a global handicap system. The movement
for a global system does not appear to come from players, but rather from the
bureaucracy. It could be part of the
USGA’s continuing quest for hegemony over the world of golf. The USGA is now the dominant partner in rules
and equipment specifications. A logical
next step would be to add handicaps to its portfolio. If centralizing control of the handicap system
is the USGA’s objective, it needs to explain why such a move would be in the best
interest of the game.
[1]
John Bodenhamer is the Senior Managing Director of Rules, Competition, and
Equipment at the USGA. Note the absence
of “handicapping” in his title. In fact,
none of the USGA’s senior leadership team has “handicapping” in their job
title. This gives the impression handicapping is not all that important within
the bureaucracy of the USGA.
[2]
CONGU stands for the Council of National Golf Unions and is the handicap
authority in Great Britain and Ireland.
[3] A
typical golf association charges around $40 for a membership which includes a
USGA handicap. It probably costs $2 to
provide the handicap leaving the association to spend $38 as it sees fit.
[4] Had Newport examined the Australian handicap system,
he would have known this was not a “bad move.”
A player’s Golf Australia handicap is the same as an Index in the
U.S. If both players have the same
Index, the U.S. player is better than the Australian Player. There are four reasons for this. First, Australia uses the best eight scores
while the U.S. uses the best ten scores in computing a player’s index. If the two players had the same scoring
record, the Australian’s Index would be lower.
Second, Golf Australia decreases the average of the eight best scores by
.93. The U.S. decreases the average of
the ten best scores by .96 (i.e., the Bonus for Excellence). Again, with the same scoring record, the
Australian’s index would be lower.
Third, equitable stroke control is much tougher in Australia. Australia uses Stableford scoring to compute
a player’s index. That means the highest
score an Australian can take is a double bogey.
So if both players took a 7 on a par three, the Australian would post a
5 while the American would (if he was between a 10 and 19 handicap) post a
7. The Australian then gets the lower
index even both players scored the same. Fourth, Golf Australia computes a Daily Course
Rating. On a tough weather day, the
Australian has his handicap differential reduced. The American does not.
[5]
George Peper in his book Two Years at
St. Andrews (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2006) documents his travails
with the differences in handicap systems between the United States and
Scotland. Nowhere in the book does Peper
argue for a global handicap system. He
probably realized he was not in Scotland to win matches, but to enjoy the
experience. He adapted to the Scottish
system and flourished.
[6]
See Dougharty, Laurence, “The Selling of the Slope Handicap System: The Big
Con?” www.ongolfhandicaps, March 24,
2015. A small sample of players was used
to examine the effect of the Slope Rating on a player’s scoring
differential. The effect was small and
statistically insignificant, but that may be due to the small sample size.
[7]
The USGA Handicap System contains
many self-admitted biases. There is
sampling error in using only 20 scores.
The handicap estimate is also a lagging indicator of a player’s current
ability. There are numerous rounding
errors made in the calculation of a player’s index and his subsequent course
handicap. There are errors in the
estimates of the Course and Slope Ratings that in turn lead to errors in the
estimate of a player’s handicap. Then
there are the errors caused by the dubious character of some players
(sandbaggers).
[8] In
theory, Sec. 10-3 of the USGA Handicap
System reduces a player’s Index for exceptional tournament
performance. In practice, however, this
section is ineffective.
[9]
See Dougharty, Laurence “The Pacific Amateur Golf Tournament: If You Go,” www.ongolfhandicaps, December 5,
2014. A player from an affiliate club
won the Pacific Amateur two years in a row but never posted the championship
round from either year.
[10]
There are also legal and economic consequences
to a global system that incorporates a DCR.
Under the DCR, a player’s index is influenced not just how he plays, but
by how others play. This means the
services of many private companies that provide handicaps services to various
golf associations and individuals will be will be forced out of the
market. An example would be MyScorecard
which provides handicaps under a USGA license for $14.95 per year. A player uses the internet to send MyScorecard
his scores, and MyScorecard uses the USGA’s formula to calculate the player’s
index. Under the proposed system,
MyScorecard could no longer provide an independent handicap service because it
would not have access to the scores of other players. The proposed system must of necessity create
a worldwide monopoly that controls scoring data—basically a super GHIN. The USGA lost a court case when it tried to
restrict who could use its handicap formula.
The proposed system is a more subtle form of restricting trade. Anyone can use the proposed formula, but no
one outside of the monopoly will have access to the data to implement the new
system. Therefore, the business model of
organizations like MyScorecard would be dead.
How the courts will view this restraint of trade is anyone’s guess.
